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JURISDICTION 
This case is on appeal from a Final Order of Judgment entered on January 11, 
2000, by Judge Leslie A. Lewis of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. Jurisdiction of this Court is appropriate pursuant to Utah 
Constitution art. VIII, sec. 5, and Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(j)(1999). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Was it error for the trial court to distinguish between an agent whose 
acknowledged fraud and deceit cost an innocent defendant to expend tens of thousands of 
dollars in attorneys fees, and that agent's principal, whose suit sought to benefit and ratify 
the agent's fraudulent conduct? This issue was raised to the trial court by way of motion. 
(R. at 979) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law, which 
[this Court] review(s) for correctness." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 
1998). See also Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co.. 828 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions are relied upon in this brief: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) (1988) 
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-10(1) (1997) 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18(2) (1997) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Wardley accused Cannon of theft when, in fact, Wardley's lawsuit amounted to an 
effort to capitalize on fraudulent and deceptive practices. Among other claims below, 
Wardley claimed that Cannon interfered with Wardley's economic relations with 
landowners and sellers Leland and Sheri Mascaro ("Mascaros"), converted Wardley's 
property, and violated sections of the Utah Administrative Code governing the lawful and 
ethical conduct of real estate agents and brokers. Specifically, Wardley claimed that 
Cannon interfered with listing agreements between Wardley and the Mascaros and 
unlawfully refused to remit the commission paid to Cannon upon the sale of the 
Mascaros5 property. These claims were added by amendment, the order granting leave 
for which instructed Wardley to investigate the claims it was making against Cannon. 
At trial, the court found that Wardley, through its agent Aries Hanson ("Hanson"), 
had altered the dates of certain listing agreements and fraudulently induced the Mascaros 
to enter into the listing agreements. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed Wardley's 
meritless claims that Cannon converted its property, acted unethically or improperly, and 
tortiously interfered with the listing agreements. 
Cannon moved the trial court to award its attorneys fees under Utah's bad faith 
statute. Wardley did not contest the reasonableness of the attorney's fees that Cannon 
sought to recover. These fees were properly supported by the Affidavit of Cannon's 
counsel pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. The trial 
court denied the motion, indicating that Wardley, as opposed to its agent Hanson, did not 
act in bad faith in bringing the action. The only issue before this Court is whether 
attorney fees should have been awarded to Cannon under Utah's bad faith statute, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1988). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
L BEFORE TRIAL WARDLEY WAS CAUTIONED TO 
INVESTIGATE ITS CLAIMS: 
Wardley first brought suit only against the Mascaros on November 7, 1994, (R. at 
1), alleging that Wardley had found a ready, willing and able buyer for the Mascaros' 
property, and that pursuant to signed listing agreements Wardley was entitled to a 
commission from the Mascaros. (R. at 4.) After learning that the Mascaro property was 
sold to someone other than Wardley's buyer, Wardley amended its complaint on August 
4, 1995, (R. at 81) to add and bring claims against Cannon alleging only unlawful 
interference with contract and civil conspiracy. (R. at 87-89.) Over a year later, on 
August 19, 1996, Wardley moved to amend its complaint for a second time for the 
purpose of, among other things, adding three more claims against Cannon. (R. at 175-
76.) Cannon opposed Wardley's motion to file a second amended complaint. (R. at 
248.) Although the trial court allowed Wardley to file a second amended complaint, it 
expressly cautioned Wardley about bringing claims against Cannon for which no good 
faith basis existed. 
The Motion to Amend Complaint is granted. It should be 
noted that this Court is not ruling on the viability of any of 
plaintiff s new claims. Plaintiff is urged to very carefully 
assess the facts and law and only file those claims that can be 
brought in good faith after diligent exploration of the facts. 
(R. at 269.) Court's Ruling dated October 9, 1996, a true and correct copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" (emphasis added.) Despite the trial court's admonition, 
Wardley chose to file its Second Amended Complaint against Cannon, wherein Wardley 
alleged that Cannon violated the Utah Administrative Code, converted Wardley's 
property, and intentionally interfered with listing agreements executed between Wardley 
and the Mascaros. (R. at 278-80.) 
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II. HANSON'S AND THUS WARDLEY'S FRAUD AND DECEIT 
WERE ESTABLISHED AT TRIAL 
Trial began on June 8? 1998 and continued through June 11, 1998. At the 
conclusion of the trial, the court ruled from the bench that Wardley had not established a 
cause of action against Cannon under the Utah Administrative Code. (R. at 927.) 
Likewise, the court also ruled that Wardley had not met its burden of proof in connection 
with its claim that Cannon interfered with Wardley's prospective economic relations. (R. 
at 927.) Finally, the court ruled that Wardley had not met its burden of proof as to its 
claim that Cannon's failure to remit the commissions on the sale of the Mascaros5 
property to Cannon constituted conversion. (R. at 927.) The trial court took the 
remaining issues raised in Wardley5 s Second Amended Complaint under advisement. (R. 
at 927.) 
On August 28, 1998, the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision, a true and 
correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B." (R. at 937.) The trial court 
found that Wardley5 s agent changed and altered dates in the listing agreements with the 
Mascaros. Wardley had accused Cannon of interfering with these agreements. (R. at 
943-44.) The trial court also found that Wardley5s agent, to induce the Mascaros to sign 
the listing agreements, fraudulently represented that the listing agreements would be 
limited to one-party and would expire in one day. (R. at 944.) Specifically, the trial 
court found that Wardley5s agent "altered the November 15, 1993, date which was 
originally found on the first listing agreement and added expiration dates to the remaining 
three listing agreements to reflect an unagreed and unintended one-year duration.55 (R. at 
948.) The trial court found that through its agent, Wardley took full advantage of its 
opportunity to deceive the Mascaros by hastily meeting with the Mascaros to obtain their 
signatures on the listing agreements on a Sunday, when Wardley knew that the Mascaros5 
legal counsel would most likely not be present. (R. at 949.) The trial court concluded 
that the listing agreements were fraudulently induced and, therefore, Wardley did not 
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have any viable economic relations with the Mascaras with which Cannon could 
interfere. (R. at 951.) Cannon incurred over $60,000 in fees and costs in defending 
against Wardley's claims, as set forth in the Affidavit of Mark Morris. (R. at 996-99.) 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN PRINCIPAL 
AND AGENT FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES PURPOSES 
On September 25, 1998, Cannon filed a motion to recover the attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in defending against Wardley's claims. (R. at 979.) On February 9, 2000, 
the trial court awarded Cannon $2091.45 in costs. (R. at 1393.) On April 21, 1999, the 
trial court entered its order denying Cannon's motion for attorney's fees, ruling that 
Wardley was not responsible for the fraudulent conduct of its agent because it did not 
participate in its agent's fraudulent conduct, did not know its agent was engaging in 
fraudulent conduct, and did not have reason to know that its agent had engaged in 
fraudulent conduct. (R. at 1265-66.) The trial court's April 21, 1999 order denying 
Cannon's motion for attorney's fees was incorporated by reference into the court's Final 
Order of Judgment dated January 11, 2000. (R. at 1359-60.) Cannon now appeals from 
this Final Order of Judgment. (R. at 1358-61.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
If Hanson had been the plaintiff, his liability for fees would be undisputed. But 
Utah law precluded Hanson from being the plaintiff, and instead required his broker to 
file suit. That is because under Utah's common law and statutory scheme, the broker is 
the principal, and it benefits from his agent's activities. For the same policy reason, this 
Court should hold that the broker should also bear the negative consequences of his 
agent's activities. 
For all legal and equitable purposes in this case, Wardley and its agent Hanson are 
one and the same. Wardley placed Hanson in the position of dealing with landowners. 
Wardley's agent acted to further Wardley's purposes by seeking to secure a commission 
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to Wardley. Wardley's agent fraudulently altered contracts, unlawfully induced the 
execution of contracts, and in addition to pursuing the landowners chose to prosecute an 
action against Cannon, alleging interference with contracts which he knew to be 
fraudulently and unlawfully obtained. Because Hanson was Wardley's agent, Hanson's 
bad faith in causing Wardley to bring frivolous claims against Cannon must be imputed 
to Wardley. Such liability includes liability for paying the attorney's fees that Cannon 
incurred in defending against Wardley's frivolous and bad faith action. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1), Cannon, as the prevailing party, is 
entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees to compensate for defending against 
Wardley's meritless and bad faith claims. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) (1988). 
The Utah Legislature has expressly determined that the broker is ultimately responsible 
for its agent's actions. Wardley, as the principal broker, chose to file suit against Cannon 
and was seeking to benefit from its agent's activities in securing a commission on the sale 
of the Mascaros' property. Given that Wardley stood to benefit from its agent's efforts to 
secure a commission, it follows that the trial court erred in concluding that Wardley 
would suffer no consequences from its agent's bad faith. 
As between Cannon and Wardley, Wardley should answer for its agent's conduct 
and pay fees to Cannon. It was Wardley who put Hanson in the position and empowered 
him with the authority to deceive the Mascaros and fraudulently create the contracts upon 
which Wardley's claims against Cannon were based. Even if this Court agrees with the 
trail court's conclusion that Wardley, as a brokerage, was a victim of the dishonesty of its 
own agent, it cannot ignore the fact that Wardley was in a superior position to prevent the 
fraud of its own agent. Utah courts have consistently held that as between two innocent 
persons, one of whom must suffer through the fraud of third, that the one who puts it in 
the power of the other to practice the fraud must suffer the loss. In addition, it was 
Wardley that prosecuted the action against Cannon. Wardley was seeking to benefit from 
the fraudulent and unlawful activities of its agent. In such circumstances, Utah courts 
Wolfd\SLC\127327.5 
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have uniformly concluded that the burden should fall upon Wardley. Unless Cannon is 
reimbursed for the attorney's fees it paid in defending against Wardley's claims, Cannon 
alone will suffer the consequences of Hanson's dishonesty. Therefore, this Court should 
reverse the trial court's denial of Cannon's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, and 
order Wardley to pay to Cannon the sum of $63,857.50 in attorneys' fees, plus Cannon's 
reasonable costs and attorneys fees incurred in this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. CANNON IS ENTITLED TO FEES BECAUSE WARDLEY'S 
AGENT ACTED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT, 
AND WARDLEY RATIFIED HIS CONDUCT BY PURSUING A 
COMMISSION. 
Below, Wardley claimed that it should not be liable for Cannon's attorneys' fees 
because Hanson's fraudulent conduct was beyond the scope of his employment with 
Wardley. Utah law and common law do not support this claim. 
W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 70, at 502 (5th ed. 1984) 
defines the basic function that the term "scope of employment" serves in respondeat 
superior cases: 
It [scope of employment] refers to those acts which are so 
closely connected with what the servant is employed to do, 
and so fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that they may be 
regarded as methods, even though quite improper ones, of 
carrying out the objectives of the employment. . . . [I]n 
general the servant's conduct is within the scope of his 
employment if it is of the kind which he is employed to 
perform, occurs substantially within the authorized limits of 
time and space, and is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose 
to serve the master. 
Id. (emphasis added.) By seeking to obtain a real estate commission for himself and 
Wardley, albeit through fraudulent means, Hanson was acting well within his scope of 
employment. 
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A. The Wardley/Hanson Relationship Meets Utah's Three Part Test 
Utah cases have tended to focus on three criteria for determining when the conduct 
of an employee falls within the scope of employment.1 First, an employee's conduct 
must be of the general kind the employee is employed to perform. See Keller v. Gunn 
Supplv Co.. 62 Utah 501, 220 P. 1063 (1923) (citing Hardeman v. Williams, 150 Ala. 
415, 43 So. 726, 10 L.R.A. 653 (1907)); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228(l)(a) 
(1958). That means that an employee's acts or conduct must be generally directed 
toward the accomplishment of objectives within the scope of the employee's duties and 
authority, or reasonably incidental thereto. In other words, the employee must be about 
the employer's business and the duties assigned by the employer, as opposed to being 
wholly involved in a personal endeavor. See Keller. 62 Utah at 505, 220 P. at 1064. This 
element is not disputed here, particularly where Wardley was entitled to a large 
percentage of the commission. 
Second, the employee's conduct must occur within the hours of the employee's 
work and the ordinary spatial boundaries of the employment. See Cannon v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co.. 60 Utah 346, 351, 208 P. 519, 521 (1922); Restatement (Second) of 
The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1958) definition of "scope of 
employment" corresponds to how Utah courts have consistently defined scope of 
employment. See Stone v. Hurst Lumber Co.. 15 Utah 2d 49, 51, 386 P.2d 910, 911 
(1963); Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co.. 119 Utah 407, 411, 228 P.2d 272, 274 
(1951): Barney v. Jewel Tea Co.. 104 Utah 292, 296, 139 P.2d 878, 879 (1943); Keller v. 
Gunn Supply Co.. 62 Utah 501, 220 P. 1063 (1923); Cannon v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Ca, 60 Utah 346, 208 P. 519 (1922). Cf Carter v. Bessev. 97 Utah 427, 431, 93 P.2d 
490, 492 (1939). Section 228 provides in part: 
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: 
(a) It is of the kind he is employed to perform; 
(b) it occurs substantially within authorized time and space limits; 
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and 
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of 
force is not unexpectable by the master. 
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Agency § 228(1 )(b). Wardley must concede Hanson's efforts with the Mascaros were 
within these boundaries. 
Third, the employee's conduct must be motivated, at least in part, by the purpose 
of serving the employer's interest. See Stone v. Hurst Lumber Co.. 15 Utah 2d 49, 51, 
386 P.2d 910, 911 (1963); Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co.. 119 Utah 407, 411, 228 
P.2d 272, 274 (1951) ("within the scope of furthering [employer's] purpose"); Barney v. 
Jewel Tea Co.. 104 Utah 292, 296, 139 P.2d 878, 879 (1943). Cf Carter v. Bessev. 97 
Utah 427, 431, 93 P.2d 490, 492 (1939) (finding employer not liable when employee's 
conduct intended "for purposes other than the master's business"). The courts in Combes 
and Carter make clear that an employer is liable for the tortious conduct of its employee 
if the employee's purpose or intent, however misguided in its means, is to further the 
employer's business interests. See also Prosser and Keeton § 70, at 503-05. Finally, the 
fact that Wardley brought this suit to enforce contractual rights Hanson procured for it, 
ratifies Hanson's conduct, and establishes this element. 
B. Once the Relationship is Established. Liability Follows 
Once an employee acts within the scope of his employment, the employer is 
bound, regardless of intent. Utah courts have previously set forth the general principles 
governing the liability of an employer for an employee's tortious acts, both for negligent 
and intentional acts. See Hodges v. Gibson Products Co.. 811 P.2d 151, 156-57 (Utah 
1991); Birkner v. Salt Lake County. 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989): see also Barney v. Jewel 
Tea Co.. 104 Utah 292, 139 P.2d 878 (1943). In Birkner. the Court held that an employer 
is liable for the torts of its employees that are committed within the scope of employment, 
even if the tortious acts were intentional and not done solely to further the interests of the 
employer. 
An employer is vicariously liable for an employee's intentional tort if the 
employee's purpose in performing the acts was either wholly or only in part to further the 
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employer's business, even if the employee was misguided in that respect. Birkner, 771 
P.2d 1057. See also W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, at 505 (5th ed. 
1984). Thus, an employer is vicariously liable for the fraudulent conduct of its 
employees, if the employee is acting to further any purpose of the employer. See 
Hodges, 811 P.2d at 156-57. Applying this principle here, Wardley is vicariously liable 
for Hanson's fraud, including the liability for attorneys fees that attached once the 
spurious claims were asserted in bad faith and pursued through trial. 
C. Vicarious Liability Applies in Litigation Contexts 
Moreover, the rule of vicarious liability for intentional torts stated in Birkner and 
reaffirmed in Hodges also applies when an employer authorizes a servant or an agent to 
initiate a legal action. See Hodges. 811 P.2d at 156-57. The Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 253 (1958) states: 
A principal who authorizes a servant or other agent to 
institute or conduct such legal proceedings as in his judgment 
are lawful and desirable for the protection of the principal's 
interests is subject to liability to a person against whom 
proceedings reasonably adapted to accomplish the principal's 
purposes are tortiously brought by the agent. 
Here, where the principal filed legal proceedings at the agent's behest, the principal has 
no less liability as the main actor than it would have if the agent had instituted such 
proceedings directly on behalf of the principal. 
Furthermore, personal knowledge material to the liability that a servant has when 
acting in a matter as to which the master has empowered the servant to act is imputed to 
the master. Section 272 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency capsulizes the rule: 
In accordance with and subject to the rules stated in this 
Topic, the liability of a principal is affected by the knowledge 
of an agent concerning a matter as to which he acts within his 
power to bind the principal or upon which it is his duty to 
give the principal information. 
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The rule imputing a servant's knowledge to the master is of particular importance in tort 
cases based on negligence, malicious prosecution, fraud, and deceit. Comment c of § 272 
states in part: 
In determining tort liability, the knowledge which the actor 
has or should have is usually of great importance. This is 
particularly true in cases of negligence and in torts which, like 
deceit or malicious prosecution, are based upon the fact that 
the defendant has acted improperly in view of the knowledge 
which he has. 
Thus, even if this Court accepts the trial court's finding that "Wardley," had no 
knowledge of Hanson's fraudulent conduct when it initiated the meritless action against 
Cannon, i.e., no one at Wardley other than its agent had knowledge of the fraud and 
baseless nature of the claims, Hanson's knowledge in causing Wardley to initiate and 
prosecute the action against Cannon is imputed to Wardley. The responsibility for the 
initiation of the action itself is imputed, as a matter of law, to Wardley, because Hanson 
acted within the scope of his authority and was motivated either in whole or in part to 
carry out Wardley's purposes. 
Hanson acted within his delegated authority in obtaining listing agreements and 
seeking to enforce those agreements for Wardley's benefit and his own. Most 
importantly, it was Wardley and not Hanson that elected to bring the claims against 
Cannon after being warned by the trial court to investigate the facts. Hence, it is not 
solely Hanson's acts giving rise to liability in Wardley, but Wardley's direct and 
intentional acts, with knowledge of fraudulent intent imputed to it. Accordingly, the bad 
faith Hanson evidenced when Wardley sought the trial court's enforcement of 
fraudulently obtained listing agreements is imputed to Wardley, and thus it should pay 
Cannon's attorneys fees. 
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m. CANNON IS ENTITLED TO FEES BECAUSE WARDLEY IS 
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FRAUDULENT CONDUCT OF ITS 
AGENT. 
The relationship between a real estate broker and its agents is that of employer and 
employee, and the universal laws applying to principals and agents, set forth above, 
control their rights and responsibilities. White v. Fox, 665 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1983); 
Wardlev Corp. v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Agency is "the fiduciary 
relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the 
other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to 
act.'" Wardley Corp. v. Welsh. 962 P.2d at 89 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency 
§ 1(1) (1958)). In the instant case, it is not disputed that Hanson was authorized to act, 
and did in fact act, as Wardley's agent. 
Wardley contends that it should not be held liable for the fraudulent conduct of its 
agent. Specifically, Wardley argued to the trial court that it had an honest belief in the 
propriety of the conduct of its agent; that it did not intend to take unconscionable 
advantage of Cannon; and it did not pursue its claims against Cannon with knowledge of 
its agent's fraudulent activities. Wardley's attempts to avoid responsibility is contrary to 
law, and unavailing here. 
It is a general doctrine of law that, although the principal is 
not ordinarily liable (for he sometimes is) in a criminal suit 
for the acts or misdeeds of his agent, unless, indeed, he has 
authorized or co-operated in those acts or misdeeds, yet he is 
held liable to third persons in a civil suit for the frauds, 
deceits, concealments, misrepresentations, torts, negligences, 
and other malfeasances or misfeasances, and omissions of 
duty of his agent in the course of his employment, although 
the principal did not authorize or justify or participate in, or 
indeed know of, such misconduct, or even if he forbade the 
acts or disapproved of them. ... In all cases the rule applies, 
respondeat superior, and it is founded upon public policy and 
convenience; for in no other way could there be any safety to 
third persons in their dealings, either directly with the 
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principal, or indirectly with him, through the instrumentality 
of agents. In every such case the principal holds out his agent 
as competent and fit to be trusted; and thereby, in effect, he 
warrants his fidelity and good conduct in all matters within 
the scope of his agency. 
Everett v. Oregon Short Line & Utah Northern RY. Co.. 9 Utah 340, 346-47, 34 P. 289, 
290 (1893) (quoting Story. Doctrine of Agency, section 452)).2 Wardley foisted Hanson 
upon the Mascaros, and now wants to ignore the damage caused to innocent third parties 
such as Cannon. 
Utah courts have consistently applied the rule of law which holds that "as between 
two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer through the fraud of third, that the one 
who puts it in the power of the other to practice the fraud must suffer the loss." Swartz v. 
White. 80 Utah 150, 152, 13 P.2d 643, 644 (1932). This doctrine was preceded, and has 
been followed by decades of Utah jurisprudence. See e.g. G. Eugene England Found v. 
Smith's Food King. 542 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1975); Valley Bank and Trust Co. v. 
Gerber, 526 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Utah 1974); Heavy v. The Commercial Nat'l Bank, 27 
Utah 222, 229, 75 P. 727, 729 (1904); Jungk v. HolbrooL 15 Utah 198, 204, 49 P. 305, 
306(1897). 
In the instant case the trial court concluded that Wardley was essentially innocent, 
that it, too, was a victim of the dishonesty of its own agent. However, unless Cannon is 
reimbursed for the attorney's fees it paid in defending against Wardley's claims, then 
Cannon alone will suffer the consequences of Hanson's dishonesty. In such 
circumstances, Utah courts have uniformly concluded that the burden should fall upon 
Wardley, as "the party that held [Hanson] out and gave him the character and standing of 
an honest man." Sullivan v. Evans-Morris Whitney Co., 54 Utah 293, 304, 180 P. 435, 
439(1919). 
The same doctrine is set forth by Mechem in his work on Agency (section 734). 
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m. THE ELEMENTS OF UTAH'S BAD FAITH ATTORNEYS FEE 
STATUTE ARE MET HERE. 
Because Wardley is imputed with knowledge of the fraudulent nature of its claims 
against Cannon, this Court should award Cannon's reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in 
defending this meritless action. Section 78-27-56(1) of the Utah Code requires the court 
to award reasonable attorneys' fees to a prevailing party if an action is without merit and 
brought in bad faith. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) (1988). 
To be entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under this statute, the prevailing party 
must show that (1) the claim or defense she prevailed upon was without merit, and (2) the 
claim or defense was not asserted in good faith. See Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Sons. 
808 P.2d 1061, 1067 (Utah 1991). If the prevailing party establishes both of these 
elements, the trial court must award attorneys' fees. Id ("If the court finds both elements 
of the statute, then it has no discretion and must award reasonable attorney fees to the 
prevailing party."). 
A. Wardley's Claims Were Without Merit. 
There is no dispute that Wardley's claims in this lawsuit were without merit. A 
claim is without merit if it is "frivolous" or "of little weight or importance having no 
basis in law or fact." Cadv v. Johnson. 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). Here, Wardley 
brought suit against Cannon seeking to recover over $110,000.00 (not including the threat 
of treble damages made by Wardley against Cannon) for Cannon's alleged interference 
with real estate listing agreements that Wardley had procured through fraudulent means. 
Wardley fraudulently induced the Mascaros to enter into the Listing Agreements. Then, 
Wardley had the audacity not only to sue the Mascaros for allegedly breaching these 
3
 Wardley has not contested the reasonableness of the attorney's fees that Cannon 
seeks to recover, which fees have been properly supported by the Affidavit of Cannon's 
counsel pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Whether 
attorneys' fees should have been awarded, as opposed to the reasonableness of the fees, is 
the only issue before this Court. 
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contracts, but also to sue Cannon for allegedly interfering with these contracts. In 
accusing Cannon of converting its property, violating the ethical standards which govern 
real estate agents, and interfering with contracts which Wardley unlawfully and 
fraudulently obtained, Wardley asserted frivolous claims which had no basis in fact or 
law. Wardley, imputed with the knowledge of its agent, knew the contracts at issue were 
fraudulently obtained. Thus, each of Wardley's claims was meritless. 
Attorneys' fees and costs are particularly warranted here when, prior to trial, the 
court expressly cautioned Wardley about proceeding with claims against Cannon, which 
after a diligent exploration of the facts would prove untenable. Nevertheless, Wardley 
chose to amend its complaint for a second time to plead three more legally baseless 
claims against Cannon than it originally pled. As set forth above, there is and was no 
basis in Utah law to assert any of the claims in the Second Amended Complaint. 
Therefore, the claims asserted in Wardley's Second Amended Complaint were "without 
merit." 
B. Wardley's Claims Were Brought in Bad Faith. 
It is not disputed that Wardley's agent acted in bad faith by fraudulently altering 
listing agreements. Moreover, Wardley does not dispute that its agent (1) lacked an 
honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (2) intended to take 
unconscionable advantage of others; or (3) intended to or acted with the knowledge that 
the activities in question would hinder, delay, or defraud others. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 
961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998): see Cadv v. Johnson. 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). 
Instead, Wardley contends that it should not be required to pay Cannon's attorneys' fees 
because its agent's bad faith should not be imputed to Wardley. This Court should reject 
that defense as a matter of law. Wardley cannot and should not be permitted to claim 
Hanson was its agent for purposes of suing on an unpaid commission, and collecting that 
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commission if it prevailed, but was not its agent when the commission claim is ultimately 
found to be based on fraud. 
The Utah Legislature has expressly determined that the broker is ultimately 
responsible for its agent's actions. Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-10(1) prohibits a real estate 
agent from accepting a commission on the sale of property directly and requires that any 
consideration paid to the agent must be paid through a principal broker with whom the 
agent is affiliated and licensed. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-10(1) (1997). In addition, 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18(2) prohibits a real estate agent from filing suit in his or her 
own name to recover a commission on the sale of a property. See Utah Code Ann § 61-
2-18(2) (1997). Accordingly, Wardley, as the principal broker, chose to file suit against 
Cannon and was seeking to benefit from its agent's activities in securing a commission 
on the sale of the Mascaros5 property. Given that Wardley stood to benefit from its 
agent's efforts to secure a commission, it follows that the trial court erred in concluding 
that Wardley would suffer no consequences from its agent's bad faith. 
Moreover, Wardley is a corporation, which can only act through its employees, 
officers and other agents. It is not disputed that Hanson was acting as Wardley's agent in 
securing the listing agreements from the Mascaros. It is also undisputed that Wardley 
considered Hanson to be its agent all through the litigation and the trial on the merits. If 
Wardley had prevailed in the suit against Cannon, Wardley, not Hanson, would have 
been entitled to the damages award. Wardley was clearly willing and intended to receive 
any benefits that resulted from the lawsuit based on Hanson's fraud. Consequently, 
Wardley should also be responsible for the risks associated with losing the lawsuit, which 
risks include paying the opposing parties' attorneys' fees when a meritless claim based 
on fraudulent inducement is brought in bad faith. 
The Second Amended Complaint was brought in bad faith. A claim is asserted in 
bad faith if, among other things, it is asserted "to take unconscionable advantage of 
others." Cady, 671 P.2d at 151. Wardley's case against Cannon was not about collecting 
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a debt based on a lawful and binding contract, or even upon a colorable claim of such. 
Rather, this case was about a real estate brokerage that, through its authorized agent, 
altered the material terms of several contracts, and then elected to expand the scope of its 
attack to Cannon, a stranger to the dealings between Mascaros and Wardley. This Court 
should not countenance Wardley's improper attempt to take advantage of Cannon in this 
lawsuit. Instead, this Court should require that Wardley pay Cannon the attorneys' fees 
and costs it has incurred in defending against this action. 
Wardley correctly asserted below that, as a general rule, fraud committed by a 
third party cannot be imputed to another defendant. However, in Jensen v. IHC Hosps., 
Inc.. 944 P.2d 327, 338 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme Court expressly held that 
"[w]here . . . there is an agency or privity relationship between the third party committing 
the fraud and the defendant, our cases indicate that liability for the agent's negligent or 
intentional tort can be imputed to the principal if the agent acts in whole or in part to 
carry out the purposes of the principal. Id, (citing Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co.. 811 
P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991); Birkner v. Salt Lake County. 771 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah 
1989)). 
Accordingly, because of the agency relationship between Hanson and Wardley, 
Utah law dictates that liability for Hanson's bad faith in bringing frivolous claims against 
Cannon should be imputed to Wardley. Wardley's liability, in this case, includes 
payment of Cannon's attorneys' fees and costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending 
against this meritless action which Wardley brought in bad faith. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, this Court should reverse the trial court's denial of 
Cannon's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, and order Wardley to pay to Cannon the 
sum of $63,857.50 in attorneys' fees. Cannon also seeks an award of costs and attorney's 
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fees incurred in bringing this appeal, pursuant to Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
i ^ 
DATED this _[2^ day of June, 2000. 
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. 
Mark O. Morris U 
David N. Wolf 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
Tracy Cannon and Cannon Associates, Inc. 
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WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS, : COURT'S RULING 
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LELAND J. MASCARO, SHERI : 
MASCARO, and TRACEY CANNON, 
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SHERI MASCARO, : 
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WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS, : 
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LELAND J. MASCARO and : 
SHERI MASCARO, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RUTH MARY HANSEN and 
ARLES HANSEN, : 
Third Party Defendants. : 
A Notice to Submit having been filed, pursuant to Rule 4-501, 
Code of Judicial Administration, in connection with defendant 
Tracey Cannon's Motion for Summary Judgment and plaintiff's Motion 
WARDLEY V, MASCARO PAGE TWO COURT'S RULING 
for Leave to File Amended Complaint, the Court having reviewed the 
Motions, Memoranda in Support and Reply Memorandum and the 
Memoranda in Opposition, and the Court being fully advised and 
finding good cause, rules as stated herein. 
The Motion For Summary Judgment was filed first and is 
therefore considered first by this Court. The Motion for Summary 
Judgment is denied because there are material facts at issue, 
including what defendant, Cannon, knew or should have known and 
when she obtained any knowledge she had, etc. 
The Motion to Amend Complaint is granted. It should be noted 
that this Court is not ruling, on the viability of any of 
plaintiff's new claims. Plaintiff is urged to very carefully 
assess the facts and law and only file those claims that can be 
brought in good faith after a diligent exploration of the facts. 
Plaintiff has ten days from the date of this Ruling to file 
the Amended Complaint and an Order consistent with this Ruling. 
Dated this i ~* day of October, 199 6. 
id 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THI 
IN AND FOR SALT I^KE COUNT,, STATE OF UTAH 
WARDLEY 
Plaintiff 
BETTER HOMES & GARDENS, 
vs. 
LELAND J. MASCARO, 
Defendants. 
i t a l . / 
LELAND J . MASCARO and SHERI 
MASCARO, 
C o u n t e r c l a i m a n t s , 
v s 
WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS 
Counterdefendant. 
LELAND J. MASCARO and SHERI 
MASCARO, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
H ^ S E N and ARLES HANSEN, 
RUTH MARY 
Third Party Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 940907000 
This case came 
before the Court for trial beginning on June 8, 
1998, and continuing through June 
U , 1998. The court having 
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received testimony and heard argument from counsel, ruled from the 
bench that the plaintiffs had not established a cause of action 
against defendant Tracy Cannon with respect to their claim that 
defendant Tracy Cannon's conduct violated the Utah Administrative 
Code. Specifically, the Court found that defendant Tracy Cannon's 
conduct was not unprofessional or unethical under the totality of 
the facts and circumstances and based upon the testimony of certain 
witnesses, including defendant Tracy Cannon and Rodney "Butch" 
Dailey, whom the Court found to be credible. The Court also ruled 
that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proof in connection 
with their claim that defendant Tracy Cannon intentionally 
interfered with the plaintiff's prospective economic relations with 
respect to the Wetcor/Michael Ahlin deal, the Michael 
Brodsky/Hamlet Development deal and the Boulder deal (see factual 
discussion below). Further, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs 
had not met their burden of proof as to their claim that defendant 
Cannon's failure to remit the commissions on the sale of the 
defendant Mascaros' property to the plaintiff constituted 
conversion. The remaining issues raised in the Second Amended 
Complaint, the Counterclaim, and the Third Party Complaint were 
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taken under advisement by the Court for further, more in-depth 
consideration. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
This Court finds that credible testimony adduced at trial, 
establishes the following facts. The Mascaros ("Mascaros") 
defendants and third-party plaintiffs, were first contacted by 
third-party defendant Aries Hansen ("Mr. Hansen") in the summer of 
1993. Mr. Hansen, who represented himself to be the agent of the 
plaintiff and counterdefendant Wardley Better Homes & Gardens 
("Wardley") , inquired whether the Mascaros were interested in-
selling approximately 128 acres of real property which is the 
subject of this lawsuit. Mr. Hansen informed the Mascaros that he 
was looking for property in that area for Michael L. Ahlin ("Mr. 
Ahlin") , President of Impact Development Corporation d/b/a Wetcor. 
After his initial meeting with the Mascaros, Mr. Hansen met 
with defendant and third-party plaintiff Sheri Mascaro ("Mrs. 
Mascaro") and requested that she sign an Option agreement. Mrs. 
Mascaro signed, but did not date, the Option agreement (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1). The terms of this Option agreement included a 20 day 
duration and gave Mr. Hansen, and his wife, third-party defendant 
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Ruth Mary Hansen ("Mrs. Hansen") , or their assigns, the right to 
purchase the Mascaros' property. 
When Mr. Hansen discovered that defendant and third-party 
plaintiff Leland Mascaro ("Mr. Mascaro") was the actual owner of 
the property, he asked the Mascaros to sign a second Option 
agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). The terms of the second Option 
agreement, dated September 14, 1993, were identical to the first 
Option agreement and was signed by both the Mascaros. According to 
the trial testimony, it was also on this date that Mrs. Mascaro 
informed Mr. Hansen that Century 21 All West Inc. ("Century 21") 
had an exclusive listing agreement on the property. The Century 21 
listing agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 30) had been signed by Mr. 
Mascaro on May 28, 1993, and provided for a six month duration. 
The Court found Mr. Hansen's testimony that he was not aware of the 
Century 21 agreement was lacking in credibility. To the contrary, 
the Court finds that the Century 21 agreement was disclosed to Mr. 
Hansen and that he requested Mrs. Mascaro to obtain a one-party 
exemption from Mr. Jerard Dinkelman, the principal broker under the 
Century 21 Agreement. Mrs. Mascaro obtained the exemption 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 29) on September 14, 1993. This exemption was 
acquired before the second Option agreement was executed. 
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It further appears from the testimony that when Mr. Ahlin did 
not make an immediate offer, Mr. Hansen engaged in other actions 
with the Mascaros, including having them write a letter 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 3), dated October 6, 1993, to put pressure on 
Mr. Ahlin to make the deal. Mrs. Mascaro conceded at trial that 
this letter, stating that she and her husband had been contacted by 
another developer offering ernest money on the parcels, was a 
fabrication. 
On October 12, 1993, Mr. Ahlin made an offer on the property 
through a Real Estate Purchase Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) of 
the same date. In addition to the Real Estate Purchase Contract, 
Mr. Hansen prepared a Dual Agency Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) 
which was signed by Mr. Ahlin and Mrs. Hansen. The Court finds 
this Agreement is significant because Mr. Hansen had continuously 
represented to the Mascaros that he was their agent exclusively. 
In addition, Mr. Rod Gordon testified that he was Mr. Ahlin's agent 
and that it was inappropriate for the Hansens to present a Dual 
Agency Agreement for Mr. Ahlin's consideration and signature. Also 
of significance is the Sales Agency Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
4) which the Hansens prepared for the Mascaros' signature. A hand-
written notation on the top of this contract expressly states that 
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it is a single party listing and that the single party is Wetcor. 
All of these documents were sent to the Mascaros and to their legal 
counsel, Mr. Mitch Olsen. Mr. Olsen testified that he advised the 
Mascaros not to sign the documents and offered to draft an original 
real estate purchase contract which included a provision for 
commission to be paid to the Hansens in the event that Mr. Ahlin 
consummated the purchase of the property (Plaintiff's Exhibit 16). 
Based on Mr. Olsen's advice, the Mascaros did not act on Mr. 
Ahlin's offer but continued to negotiate with him. In addition, 
the testimony is clear that no listing agreement was ever executed 
or contemplated by the Mascaros at that time. 
On November 14, 1993, Mr. Hansen came to the Mascaros' home 
with a number of documents. At this meeting, Mr. Hansen brought an 
Option Agreement (Defendant's Exhibit 89), a Limited Agency 
Disclosure Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 26), a blank Real Estate 
Purchase Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit 26), and four listing 
agreements ("Listing Agreements") with Salt Lake Board of Realtors 
Land Data Input Forms (Plaintiff's Exhibits 17 - 20). In his 
testimony, Mr. Hansen acknowledged that in preparing these 
documents the night before, he had predated many of them. The 
Court finds that Mr. Hansen's preparation of these documents was 
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unsolicited and that Mr. Hansen purposely met with the Mascaros on 
a Sunday without the presence of their legal counsel. It appears 
to the Court that Mr. Hansen's urgency in preparing these documents 
and having the Mascaros sign them was based on the expiration of 
the second Option agreement. It further appears from the Mascaros' 
testimony that Mr. Hansen's scheme was to have the Mascaros present 
an offer to Mr. Ahlin with the expectation that he would purchase 
a small portion of the acreage and agree to an option on the 
remainder of the land. However, because the Mascaros and Mr. 
Hansen did not yet know how many acres Mr. Ahlin would actually be 
willing to purchase, the principle terms of the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract were left blank. In addition, only the first of 
the four Listing Agreements contained an expiration date. 
The Court finds that the first Listing Agreement (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 17A) , in its unaltered state, reflects the actual agreement 
between the Mascaros and Mr. Hansen. This Listing Agreement was 
set to expire on November 15, 1993, one day after Mr. Hansen's 
Sunday meeting with the Mascaros. The Court finds that Mr. Hansen 
altered the date on this Listing Agreement from November 15, 1993 
to November 15, 1994. This finding is based on the credible 
testimony of the Mascaros and the Court's comparison of documents 
WARDLEY V, MASCARO PAGE EIGHT MEMORANDUM DECISION 
where changes are initialed (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 26), with the 
Listing Agreement marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 17A, where the 
change in the expiration date has no initials. The Court further 
finds that with respect to the other three Listing Agreements, 
which were blank with respect to the expiration dates, these were 
filled in by Mr, Hansen, subsequent to the Mascaros' signature, 
with "November 14, 1994" dates. The credible testimony established 
that Mr. Hansen's conduct in changing and/or writing in the 
expiration dates, was engaged in without the knowledge and the 
approval of the Mascaros. In addition, the dates alluded to and 
written by Mr. Hansen were contrary to the parties' agreement and 
clear understanding that the Listing Agreements would expire in one 
day. 
This Court also finds that Mr. Ahlin did subsequently sign 
both the Option Agreement and the Real Estate Purchase Contract, 
and Mrs. Hansen accepted an earnest money check for $4,000. 
Further, it is clear that the deal between the Mascaros and Mr. 
Ahlin subsequently failed. After an attempt to arbitrate the 
matter of the earnest money, the title company released the $4,000 
earnest money to Mr. Ahlin's assignees. 
WARDLEY V, MASCARO PAGE NINE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
This Court also finds that around this same time, another 
potential purchaser of the property, Michael Brodsky, President of 
Hamlet Development, began to negotiate with the Mascaros, Mr. 
Brodsky testified that he proposed purchasing the property in 
stages and thought that he and the Mascaros had reached a verbal 
agreement on the sale. . However, before the agreement was 
finalized, Mr. Brodsky was informed by the Mascaros that a sale of 
the property had occurred. In September 1994, the Mascaros 
signed a one year listing agreement with defendant Cannon 
Associates. In October 1994, the Mascaros signed a Real Estate 
Purchase Agreement agreeing to sell the property to defendant 
Tracey Cannon ("Ms. Cannon") . The Mascaros and Ms. Cannon closed 
on this property on May 11, 1995. Ms. Cannon received a commission 
from the sale of $115,338.16. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The Court determines that the listing agreements entered 
Into between Wardley and the Mascaros are voidable 
because they were secured by fraud In the Inducement. 
In its Second Amended Complaint, Wardley claims that the 
Mascaros have breached their Listing Agreements with Wardley by 
refusing to pay Wardley the 7% commission provided for in the 
Listing Agreements upon the sale of the property to Ms. Cannon. 
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Wardley argues that the sale to Ms. Cannon was entered into within 
the one-year term of the Listing Agreements. According to Wardley, 
when the sale on the property to Ms,. Cannon closed, the contractual 
requirements for Wardley's earned commission had been satisfied. 
In their Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint against 
Wardley and the Hansens, the Mascaros contend they were induced to 
sign the Listing Agreements in reliance on false representations 
made to them by Mr. Hansen. The representations which the Mascaros 
claim were fraudulent are: (1) that Mr. Hansen told them that he 
would only receive a commission for the sale of the Mascaros' 
property to Wetcor if they signed the Listing Agreements and (2) 
that the Listing Agreements would be valid for only one day and 
would apply only to the Wetcor purchase. The Mascaros also claim 
that Wardley breached its contract with them by failing to list the 
property on the MLS, and by failing to appropriately market the 
property. 
Under Utah law, a person may rely upon positive assertions 
made by another, Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980), 
and fraud in the inducement may allow the injured party to avoid 
the contract. Berkely Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 
WARDLEY V. MASCARO PAGE ELEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
798, 801-04 (Utah 1980). The nine essential elements of fraudulent 
inducement (fraud) are: 
"(1) that a representation was made; (2) 
concerning a presently existing material fact; 
(3) which was false; (4) which the representor 
either (a) knew to be false or (b) made 
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such 
representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) 
that the other party, acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely 
upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act 
(9) to his injury and damage." 
Meibos, 607 P.2d at 800. 
The Court determines that the Mascaros have proven fraudulent 
inducement because they have presented evidence supporting all of 
its elements. This Court finds most significant the fact that 
there are inconsistencies between the written terms of the Listing 
Agreements and the Mascaros' expressed intention to limit Mr. 
Hansen's representation to the Ahlin/Wetcor deal and to limit the 
duration of his representation to one day. These inconsistencies 
can only be reconciled with a finding that Mr. Hansen fraudulently 
represented that the Listing Agreements would be limited to one-
party and would expire in one day to induce the Mascaros to sign 
the Listing Agreements. As part of his fraudulent scheme, the 
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Court finds that Mr. Hansen altered the November 15, 1993, date 
which was originally found on the first Listing Agreement and added 
expiration dates to the remaining three Listing Agreements to 
reflect an unagreed and unintended one-year duration. It appears 
Mr. Hansen unilaterally modified the Listing Agreements to 
improperly expand the scope of his representation beyond that 
contemplated by the Mascaros. The Court finds that Mr. Hansen's 
modifications were made without the Mascaros' knowledge and at a 
time when they did not have counsel available on the benefit of 
necessary legal advice. Based on the Mascaros' testimony, which 
the Court found to be credible, they were induced into signing 
incomplete drafts of the Listing Agreements during a Sunday 
meeting, when their legal counsel was apparently unavailable, 
because of Mr. Hansen's representation that it was the only way for 
him to receive a commission on the deal and his assurances that the 
final version of the Listing Agreements would contain the 
limitations they had discussed. In addition, the Mascaros' 
testified that they failed to take any additional precautions such 
as filling out the blank spaces because of their belief that Mr. 
Hansen had their best interests in mind. On this topic, the Court 
found Mrs. Mascaro's statement that "blind trust walked in and care 
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walked out" to be a particularly compelling statement concerning 
the Mascaros' reliance upon Mr. Hansen's representations and the 
opportunity for deception by Mr, Hansen, The Court finds that Mr. 
Hansen took full advantage of this opportunity by arriving for a 
hastily scheduled meeting with the Mascaros, whom Mr. Hansen knew 
to be represented by legal counsel, on a Sunday, when counsel would 
be unlikely to be available. 
Overall, the Court found that the Mascaros' belief that they 
were operating under a one-day, one-party listing agreement was 
corroborated by documents received into evidence and the totality 
of credible trial testimony. For instance, the Sale Agency 
Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) presented to the Mascaros and 
signed by Mrs. Hansen imparts the Hansens' acknowledgment of the 
Mascaros' expressed intention to limit the Hansens' listing to "a 
single party listing . . . The single party is Wetcor." Further, 
the Court finds that Mr. Hansen was aware of the Century 21 Listing 
and was fully cognizant he could represent the Mascaros only if he 
could obtain a one-party exemption. Mr. Hansen's request that Mrs. 
Mascaro obtain a one-party exemption from Century 21 is congruent 
with the Mascaros' express reservations that their listing 
agreement with the Hansens be limited to the Ahlin/Wetcor deal and 
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with the Hansens' recognition that their representation had to be 
limited to one-party so as not run afoul of the Century 21 Listing. 
Next, it is significant to the Court that the change in the 
expiration date on the first Listing Agreement was not initialed. 
When compared to other documents where changes were initialed by 
the Mascaros, the lack of initials on the altered expiration date 
strongly suggests to the Court that the date was modified after the 
Mascaros signed this Listing Agreement and without their knowledge 
or permission. The Hansens' actions and the trail of documents 
speak loudly and convincingly that the Mascaros signed the Listing 
Agreements only because of Mr. Hansen's fraudulent 
misrepresentations and false assurances concerning the duration and 
scope of these agreements. In reaching this determination, the 
Court has given due consideration to all of the evidence, including 
the Mascaros' confessed lack of expertise in real estate matters 
and the particular facts surrounding Mr. Hansen's insistence that 
they sign the Listing Agreements on a Sunday, when they did not 
have access to their legal counsel. The existence of these proven 
facts in this case defeats Wardley's recovery upon the Listing 
Agreements. This Court concludes it would be inequitable, would be 
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unjust, and unlawful for this Court to enforce agreements, procured 
through fraudulent inducement. 
The Court notes that there are also other possible grounds on 
which the Mascaros could avoid liability under the Listing 
Agreements, including the doctrine of mistake. However, since the 
Court finds that the Listing Agreements are voidable on the grounds 
of fraudulent inducement, the Court deems it unnecessary to 
consider alternative theories. 
To summarize, the Court rules against Wardley on its claim 
that the Mascaros breached the Listing Agreements. Specifically, 
the Court rules that the Listing Agreements are unenforceable. 
Further, the Court rules against Wardley on its claim that Ms. 
Cannon interfered with Wardley's economic relations with respect to 
the Mascaros. Since the Listing Agreements were unenforceable, 
Wardley did not have viable economic relations with the Mascaros, 
with which Ms. Cannon could interfere. 
With respect to the Mascaros' Counterclaim and Third-Party 
Complaint, the Court's ruling that the Listing Agreements are 
unenforceable renders moot the Mascaros' claim that they are 
entitled to attorney's fees and costs as specified within the terms 
of the Listing Agreements. In other words, in disaffirming the 
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terms of the Listing Agreements, the Mascaros cannot seek to 
selectively reinstate only certain portions of the Listing 
Agreements which are favorable to them. The same concept applies 
to the Mascaros' claim that Wardley breached the terms of the 
Listing Agreements. As stated previously, since fraudulent 
inducement has been proven, the terms of the Listing Agreement are 
not enforceable or binding on either the Mascaros or Wardley. In 
so ruling, the Court has essentially placed the Mascaros in the 
same position that they were in before the Listing Agreements were 
executed. 
With respect to the Mascaros' claim for damages on fraud, it 
is this Court's view that the Mascaros have been restored to their 
former position by this Court's determination that the Listing 
Agreements are void. Moreover, while the Mascaros may have 
suffered emotional angst over the Hansens' conduct and whether 
their property would be sold, there is no evidence that this 
distress resulted in any compensatory damages. As a corollary, the 
Mascaros have not presented any evidence that they have suffered a 
pecuniary loss, particularly in light of their sale of the property 
to Ms. Cannon under more beneficial terms than were offered by the 
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Ahlin/Wetcor deal. Accordingly, the Court denies the Mascaros' 
claim for damages. 
Counsel for the Mascaros is to prepare an Order and Findings 
consistent with, but not limited to the content of this Ruling 
within fifteen (15) days. 
Dated this 2 9 day of August, 1998. 
LESLIE AJ LEWIS 
DISTRICT !COURT JUDGE 
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